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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• This year, 2014, is election year in Indonesia. There are however vigilantes
such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI; Defenders of Islam Front) who reject
secular democracy and instead advocate a return to what they argue are
the Islamic foundations of the Indonesian constitution and state ideology.
• But despite declaring democracy haram (sinful), the FPI and other such
groups have proven themselves adept at manipulating the dynamics of
Indonesia’s decentralised electoral system to their advantage, obtaining
key policy concessions and positioning themselves as brokers for political
elites seeking to capture the conservative Muslim vote.
• These have found ideological bedfellows amongst New Order apologists
seeking to roll back democratic reforms. Calls for ‘democratic downgrad-
ing’ from political parties such as Partai Demokrat, considered alongside
the authoritarian credentials of a number of frontrunner presidential candi-
dates suggest that Indonesia’s democratic future is by no means secure.
• In the run-up to the elections for the presidency and national legislature
in 2014, a number of political parties have shown interest in forming
alliances with the FPI. The key exception has been the PDI-P and its likely
presidential candidate, the governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo.
2
INTRODUCTION
“Democracy is more dangerous than pig’s meat!” declared Habib Rizieq Shihab, 
leader of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI; Defenders of Islam Front) during a speech at 
a local branch in West Java in April 2013.1 According to Rizieq, embracing democ-
racy was tantamount to abandoning fundamentals of the Islamic faith, posing a far 
greater threat to the spiritual integrity of the ummah than the consumption of forbid-
den substances such as pork. “If we consume pig”, he stated, “we are polluted, but 
can still be returned to a state of purity if we cleanse ourselves seven times. If we eat 
it we’ve sinned, however we haven’t become an infidel.” 
Democracy, however, he argued, marks an irredeemable point of no return. “If 
democracy is fully embraced by Muslims, and the laws of Allah in turn ignored, then 
they become apostates (murtad). Democracy can transform us into infidels”. 
Established in 1998, and initially subsidised by the military and police as part of 
a street-level militia mobilised against the student-led reform movement, the FPI has 
now for over 15 years expressed ‘alarm’ and outrage at liberal democracy, represent-
ing it as a threat to Islamic practice and belief. Many in Indonesia consider it the lat-
est manifestation of political thuggery, albeit wearing religious robes rather than the 
camouflage fatigues of former regime henchmen such as the Pemuda Pancasila, but 
with far greater autonomy from its patrons; itself a product of the greater freedom 
of organisation available in the post-New Order period. Its mission statement, the 
Quranic edict of amar makruf nahi mungkar (to command the good and forbid the 
bad), is framed as a necessary defensive response to the excesses unleashed by 
Indonesia’s post-authoritarian transition. As one FPI leader expressed it, “democratic 
reform opened the door for change, the problem however is that just about anyone 
or anything has been able to walk through that door…pornographers, homosexuals, 
apostates, all manner of heresy and deviancy”. The door of democratic reform, in their 
opinion, needs to be closed shut. 
Despite its unambiguous rejection of electoral democracy as being antithetical to 
Islam, and as a virtual ‘pathway to hell’, hardliners and conservatives such as the FPI 
have nonetheless proved adept in playing a particular kind of politics shaped by the 
broader framework of Indonesia’s decentralised electoral system. The FPI has carved 
out a niche for itself in the political landscape by intentionally prising open social ten-
sions and instigating moral panics through which it has sought to situate itself as a 
broker; as a kind of morality racketeer. Some of its successes include pressuring the 
state to legalize the persecution of religious minorities (in particular followers of the 
Ahmadiyah sect); politicising the previously uncontentious issue of church construc-
tion in Muslim majority neighbourhoods; influencing anti-pornography legislation; and 
forcing the government to ban a number of musical and cultural events such as a 
1 Arrahmah.com, ‘Habib Rizieq: Demokrasi lebih bahaya dari babi’, 2 April, 2013, http://www.arrahmah.com/
news/2013/04/02/habib-rizieq-demokrasi-lebih-bahaya-dari-babi.html
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concert by US pop star Lady Gaga. They have also proven adept at strategically po-
sitioning themselves as key brokers for political parties and elites seeking to capture 
the perceived ‘Muslim vote’, particularly as found in the broader conservative shift 
within mainstream Indonesian Islam over the past decade. As such, they have been 
able to punch far above their weight in terms of the ability to influence local govern-
ment policies. The organisation is relatively small in size, with an active national mem-
bership of at most one to two hundred thousand.
The ‘anti-democracy’ stance has become in effect a valuable and increasingly 
popular form of political capital. It is also not limited to Islamists, with a number 
of groups and individuals advocating various types of ‘democratic downgrading’, 
from the ending of regional direct elections advocated by the Democrat Party, to 
the increasing expressions of sentimentality for the Suharto era. As Jacqui Baker 
has noted, the failure of President Yudhoyono to implement key reforms during his 
two terms, such as overhauls of the endemically corrupt judicial system, police force 
and military will leave in place a “framework for authoritarianism”.2 Considering the 
authoritarian credentials of a number of frontrunner presidential candidates for 2014, 
Indonesia’s democratic future is by no means secure. 
MUSYAWARAH, NOT DEMOCRACY
What is it about Indonesia’s post-1998 democracy that apparently so reviles 
Islamists such as the FPI? And what do they see as their preferred alternative? In 
his book-length treatise, Wawasan Kebangsaan: Menuju NKRI Bersyariah (National 
Concept: Achieving a Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia Ruled by Syariah 
Law), Habib Rizieq identifies the so-called ‘problem of democracy’ in Indonesia as a 
problem of history requiring a return to what he argues are the Islamic foundations of 
the Indonesian republic and constitution. According to Rizieq, there was never any 
constitutional declaration that Indonesia was a ‘democratic state’; rather the fourth 
principle of the state ideology of Pancasila establishes the republic as a nation based 
upon musyawarah and mufakat, or consensus decision-making through deliberation, 
which he claims is an authentic Islamic tradition and the mode of governance prac-
ticed by the Prophet Muhammad, or the “government of Allah”. Unlike Islamist groups 
such as Hizbut Tahrir or the Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia, the FPI does not reject 
the Pancasila as a national ideology, but instead argues that its inherently Islamic 
foundations have been misinterpreted and subverted by the infiltration of Western 
notions of majority-rule democracy and values of liberalism and secularism which are 
all flawed human-created value systems. 
The FPI insists that musyawarah-mufakat is a form of decision-making process 
fundamentally different from the ‘majority rules’ logic of secular democracy which can 
2 Jacqui Baker (2012), ‘Indonesia and Australia: what makes neighbours good friends?’, East Asia Forum, 17 Au-
gust, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/17/indonesia-and-australia-what-makes-neighbours-good-friends/ 
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be easily manipulated and guided by human weakness; and which results in the crea-
tion of rules and laws in direct conflict with Islam. Embracing musyawarah as both 
an Islamic principle of government and as a foundation of the Indonesian constitu-
tion would require an end to electoral democracy in its current form. The concept of 
NKRI Bersyariah articulated by Rizieq and the FPI occupies in this respect a middle-
ground between Islamists who reject the constitution and the republic entirely, and 
that of secular and authoritarian nationalists who reject liberal forms of democracy 
but see no exclusivist place for Islam. 
The second key point for the FPI is the need to re-include the Jakarta Charter in 
the Indonesian Constitution. The core of the charter was the addition of six words to 
the first principle of the Pancasila, where “Belief in Almighty God” is qualified with 
“the obligation to follow Islamic Syariah for all Muslims”. In what the FPI considers 
to be a historical betrayal, the amendment was eventually dropped by nationalists 
including Sukarno and Hatta in the final drafting. 
The FPI’s stance then is nationalist rather than pan-Islamic, in so far as it reiter-
ates the importance of the territorial integrity of the republic, and the centrality of the 
Constitution and the Pancasila. In recent times, it has engaged in overtly nationalistic 
demonstrations, for example, outside the Australian Embassy after revelations of spy-
ing on Indonesian government ministers, in what some suspect was a campaign to 
highlight its pro-nationalist credentials prior to the national legislative and presidential 
elections to be held in 2014. 
In order to achieve its goal of NKRI Bersyariah, the FPI and its allies such as the 
Forum Umat Islam or FUI, have engaged in street protests and mobilisations, regular 
acts of vigilante violence, and aggressive advocacy around select issues strategically 
chosen to generate maximum publicity. They have also flirted with the possibility of 
directly contesting via the democratic system they reject. For example, in 2008, the 
FPI briefly debated forming its own political party. They argued that existing Islamic 
parties, such as the PKS, PKB and PAN, had already lost their way, compromis-
ing their values by forming alliances with secularists, or embracing non-Muslims as 
candidates. The spirit of a ‘revolutionary Islam’, which concerned itself “only with 
the politics of Syariah, and not the politics of vested interests” was, in their view, no 
longer represented in the party system.3 Eventually, the idea was dropped, as it was 
considered to involve too many compromises.
Rizieq has also been championed by the organisation as a potential presidential 
candidate, together with a number of high-profile figures such as Cholil Ridwan, 
chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia. The FPI’s position that the nation should be 
led by Islamic religious scholars rather than politicians is one with obvious appeal to 
the MUI, with whom the organisation has developed a mutually beneficial relationship 
as the ‘enforcer’ of its often controversial fatwa. Perhaps the most significant of these 
was the 2005 fatwa declaring liberalism, secularism and pluralism as haram (sinful 
3 Interview with Habib Rizieq, Jakarta, December 2012. 
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or forbidden in Islam). In many respects, the fatwa was a conservative reaction to the 
growing popularity of liberal streams of thought within mainstream Islamic organisa-
tions such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, exemplified in the minds of con-
servatives by the Jaringan Islam Liberal, or Liberal Islam Network. The FPI however 
took the anti-liberalism directive further, not just as a rejection of the spread of liberal 
ideas, but as a wholesale critique of the existing democratic system. If liberalism was 
haram, then liberal democracy must also be haram. The anti-liberal movement has 
subsequently grown to encompass a broad coalition of Islamist groups together with 
conservatives from mainstream Islamic organisations. 
Earlier in March 2011, al-Jazeera revealed the existence of a document outlin-
ing the structure of a so-called Revolutionary Islamic Council. Compiled by former 
Hizbut Tahrir leader, head of the Forum Umat Islam and close confidant of the FPI, 
Muhammad Al Khathath, it was formulated as an Islamist ‘dream team’. Al Khathath 
explained that in the wake of the Bank Century corruption scandal there was a sense 
that the government could collapse at any time; hence it was necessary to formu-
late an alternative government to fill any resulting power vacuum. FPI figures feature 
prominently in the shadow cabinet, with Habib Rizieq as head of state, FPI spokes-
man and lawyer Munarman as Minister of Defence, and jailed radical cleric Abu Bakar 
Bashyir as part of a council of religious elders. Aside from Islamists, former New 
Order generals such as Tyasno Sudarto also featured in the shadow cabinet. While 
denying any knowledge of the document, Sudarto admitted to holding discussions 
with Islamist groups on the ‘future of the nation’, as they both shared a desire for a 
return to the Pancasila as they understood it, and a rejection of moves towards liberal 
democracy. The document created a brief furore, and was considered by some in 
Yudhoyono’s camp as evidence of a military-Islamist plot to topple the government. It 
may have been little more than wishful thinking on the part of Al Khathath. However, 
this episode indicated that there was a point of ideological connection between New 
Order apologists seeking to roll back democratic reforms and Islamists. Rizieq has at 
times publicly praised former dictator Suharto as ‘decisive’ and ‘charismatic’.
DEMOCRATIC MEANS TO AN UN-DEMOCRATIC END?
How then is the FPI situating itself in relation to the 2014 elections? In an official 
position statement released in August 2013, the FPI stated that the elections con-
stituted a “period of dire emergency” for Indonesian Muslims, as it holds the danger 
that those who will gain control of the political reins could further the spread of 
apostasy (kemurtadan).4 To this end, the FPI implores Muslims to choose candidates 
and support political parties that display a commitment to enforcing Syariah Law and 
4 Arrahmah.com, ‘Sikap FPI Pemilu 2014: Darurat bagi umat Islam’, 31 August 2013, http://www.arrahmah.com/
news/2013/08/31/sikap-fpi-pemilu-2014-darurat-umat-islam.html 
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reflecting the concerns of the ummah. Despite its rejection of democracy, the FPI 
encourages Muslims to participate in it as a means of ending it. As with most of its 
public pronouncements, the statement was also to advertise that the FPI was open 
to offering support to those willing to pay lip service to its pet issues.
The FPI has already indicated some of those whom it considers unacceptable 
candidates. An example is former general Wiranto and his political party Hanura, an 
initial sponsor of the FPI during his period as armed forces chief. This is ostensibly 
due to his objectionable public support for the hosting of the Miss World pageant in 
Indonesia. The FPI had strongly opposed the pageant with rowdy street demonstra-
tions and threats of disruptions, resulting in the event being moved from Bogor in 
West Java to Bali. The pageant was also sponsored by Wiranto’s vice-presidential 
candidate, the ethnic Chinese billionaire media mogul Harry Tanoesoedibjo, whom 
Rizieq has publicly referred to as an infidel and “pig”, who needed to be “slaughtered 
and burnt”. 
The governor of West Java, Ahmad Heryawan, currently short-listed by the Islamist 
PKS as one of its five potential presidential candidates, is an FPI favourite. During 
his campaign for re-election in 2012, he had shown his amenability to making deals 
with the FPI, signing a political pledge that if returned to office he would outlaw 
Ahmadiyah and its activities in West Java. The strongest party support for the FPI has 
come from the Islamic PPP. The party’s chairman and current Minister of Religion, 
Suryadharma Ali, has been a regular public advocate of the FPI, even extending an 
offer to its fiery public spokesman Munarman to run as a legislative assembly candi-
date. Questioned over the appropriateness of collaborating with a group infamous 
for its use of vigilante violence, Suryadharma argued that it was better than not to 
embrace radical organisations into the system where they could, in his words, “make 
a positive contribution”. The PPP’s reaching out to the FPI, as well as a number of 
other well-known Islamists, is part of an attempt to establish itself as a purely Islamic 
party, differentiating it from others such as the PKS who have supported non-Muslim 
candidates. 
On the back of the FPI’s announcement regarding the 2014 elections, Home 
Minister Gamawan Fauzi, who less than ten months earlier had threatened to forcibly 
disband the FPI via recently revised laws governing non-government organisations, 
followed Suryadharma’s lead in stating in October 2013 that the FPI was now a ‘na-
tional asset’ and that regional and national leaders should work in partnership with 
them. Prabowo Subianto, considered a potential presidential frontrunner, responded 
positively to Gamawan’s call by suggesting that the FPI could and should be “em-
braced”. In short, there has been a considerable degree of renewed interest in ‘en-
gaging’ with the FPI by political elites in the period leading up to the 2014 elections, 
which raises uncomfortable questions about their own commitment to democracy. 
It seems likely that part of the logic behind moves to form alliances with the FPI and 
other Islamist groups is a strategic calculation to secure votes from particular con-
stituencies with minimal substantive concessions. 
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This needs to be situated in the context of predictions of increasing levels of non-
participation and informal voting, or Golput.5 Only 7.7 per cent in the first post-New 
Order multi-party elections in 1999, non-participation had risen to close to 30 per 
cent by the national elections of 2009. Some have estimated that rates of Golput in 
2014 could reach 40 per cent or even as high as 60 per cent. The reasons behind 
the increase in Golput are strongly debated. After all, it is difficult to attribute agency 
to acts of non-participation. However, the general consensus is that it reflects a 
growing disillusionment with the substance of institutional democracy. The almost 
daily revelations of governmental corruption at every level have seen the initial post-
authoritarian euphoria slowly transform into a cynical disinterest, even disdain, to-
wards the electoral process. Appealing to conservative Islamists and their sympathis-
ers entails fairly minimal political concessions, such as adopting a hard-line stance 
against soft political targets like religious minorities, with the potential to electorally 
mobilise groups ideologically disinclined to vote. This arguably appears as a poten-
tially easier electoral path for some parties and candidates than, for example nego-
tiating demands for increases to the minimum wage with the growing trade union 
movement; or developing coherent policies for reducing Indonesia’s growing poverty 
levels. Groups such as the FPI also have potential use, in the words of former police 
chief Sutanto, as ‘attack dogs’ that can be deployed against progressive or liberal 
social forces. 
The main potential spoiler, from the FPI’s perspective, is the immense popularity 
of Joko Widodo or Jokowi, the former mayor of Surakarta and current governor of 
Jakarta. Many expect that he will run as either a presidential or vice-presidential can-
didate, with most polls putting him far ahead of other candidates, aside from Golput. 
His party, the PDI-P, has remained one of the most openly hostile to the FPI and 
the least amenable to granting concessions or cutting deals with Islamist groups. 
The FPI has already butted heads with Jokowi’s Jakarta administration, in particular 
the deputy governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, who publicly 
ridiculed Gamawan’s suggestion of government-FPI collaboration. A similar rebuttal 
came from Ganjar Pranowo, the PDI-P governor of Central Java. 
Some in Jokowi’s inner circle have claimed that his popularity is undermining 
support for local Islamist groups such as the FPI in Jakarta, particularly amongst the 
urban poor who make up the bulk of the FPI’s membership. The so-called Jokowi-
effect, however, may also be overstated. Jokowi-endorsed candidates, for example, 
failed to win elections for governor in West Java and North Sumatra in 2013, losing 
in both cases to PKS-endorsed candidates. 
5 Golput, or Golongan Putih, literally meaning ‘White group’, refers to an election boycott movement started by 
intellectuals in the early 1970s to reject the rigged pseudo-elections of the New Order. It has since become 
shorthand for active or passive non-participation in elections, or the intentional casting of invalid votes, as a politi-
cal statement. 
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Ultimately any failure to significantly shape the outcome or the policy orientation 
of the winners of the 2014 elections will be attributed to the nature of democracy 
itself and its system of ‘one person, one vote’ where, in the words of Rizieq “the voice 
of a prostitute or an alcoholic is considered of equal value to that of an esteemed 
Ulama or Habib”. 
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